| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 95 === This study investigates whether the agency problem arising from controlling shareholders of companies listed in Taiwan affects auditor choice. The empirical results includes two parts. For the IPO firms, when the control right of the controlling shareholders is higher, the probability that the firm engages a Big Six auditor is lower. But the result is statistically insignificant. However, when a divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights of the controlling shareholders is larger, firms are more willing to appoint Big Six auditor. Furthermore, whether the controlling shareholders control the manager and hold larger proportion of board seats doesn’t affect firms’ decisions about appointing Big Six auditors. Overall, some hypotheses are not supported. The possible reason is that the agency problem arising from controlling shareholders may not be the only consideration for the IPO firms in selecting auditors. On the other hand, there is no significant relationship between control rights and ownership divergence of the controlling shareholders and auditor switching decisions of IPO firms.
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