THE STUDY ABOUT THE DETERMINANT FACTORS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND SUPERVISORS’ VOLUNTARY TURNOVER IN TAIWAN

• Main Authors: LEE, CHIN-LUNG, 李金龍
• Other Authors: LEE, JIAN-RAN
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2007
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26719273154134817560

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 95 === In order to improve corporate governance and protect investors, on February 22, 2002, the Security Exchange Commission decreed that for any company to be publicly listed or traded over the counter, its Board of Directors should have at least two independent directors and one independent supervisor before IPO applications. After the system implemented, the independent directors and supervisors continually resigned their positions voluntarily. Therefore the effect of the independent directors and supervisors can’t be attained completely. The main purpose of this study is to examine, based on three prospects: corporate governance, financial crisis prediction and economic incentive, the factors of independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover. It will be helpful to the government to construct wonderful related systems. At the same time, it will be also helpful to investors, companies which employ independent directors and supervisors, independent directors and supervisors who were employed or will be employed to make a better decision. The study uses Logit regression model to analyze the determinant factors of independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover in Taiwan. The samples include 70 independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover in public companies and 70 matching samples from January 2003 to March 2007. Independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover is as dependent variable. The factors of independent directors and supervisors’ voluntary turnover are analyzed from corporate governance, financial crisis prediction and economic incentive. It is constructed 16 hypothesizes and 16 independent variables. Size of company is considered controlling variable. The three variables are made of the model of the study. The study is expected that independent directors and supervisors will demit voluntarily to avoid the juridical responsibilities and protect their fame or consider economic incentive when they faced the risks and pressures or insufficient economic incentive. The outcomes of this research indicate that independent directors and supervisors will tend to demit voluntarily because of CEOS’ voluntary turnover, higher related party transaction ratio, higher debt ratio and lower pay of independent directors and supervisors.