| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 產業經濟學系碩士班 === 95 === Because of economic and environmental problems, exhaustion of fossil fuels, and the positive externality of renewable energy, all countries pay attention to renewable energy as a fossil fuel substitute. However, even though renewable energy is friendly to environment, the life cycle of renewable energy may pollute the environment. Therefore, governments have not only to develop the renewable energy but also to internalize the negative externalities from renewable energy.
This thesis studies the optimal policies of renewable energy in closed and open economies. In the case of closed economy, the optimal emission tax and energy subsidy are Pigouvian ones if the market structure is perfectly competitive. When the market structure is monopoly or oligopoly, the optimal emission tax is also a Pigouvian one. The optimal subsidy, however, is higher than the Pigouvian one. Moreover, the higher the market power, the higher the subsidy rate.
In the case of open economy, a two-country duopoly model is used to analyze. When two governments act noncooperatively, we find that the government who exports renewable energy would levy a Pigouvian tax on its domestic firm. The importer government would levy an emission tax which is lower than the Pigouvian tax and give a subsidy which is higher than the Pigouvian subsidy to its firm. When two governments act cooperatively, the cooperative tax is equal to the marginal damage and the cooperative subsidy is higher than the marginal benefit of total renewable energy. In addition, the cooperative tax and subsidy are higher and lower than the noncooperative tax and subsidy, respectively.
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