| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 土地管理所 === 96 === Many researches had indicated that the problem of water resources management is there are so many bureaus are in charge that the bureaus could not corporate with each other. But as the history shows, the relations between these bureaus can be both conflicted and corporated. Besides the factor of institution that many studies had discussed, the inducement and the driving force of action are also factors that influence the bureaus too.
In ordre to analyse how the bureau act and the integration problem are formulated, this article discuss the characters of public organizations first, than the public choice theory, the policy territory theory, and the autonomy theory are also included. With these theories, I advanced the model and proposition of bureau integration decision-making.
With the self-interest hypothesis, the interaction of bureaus showst that because of the bureaucract always tries to maximize personal utility, so the bureaus always competed rather than corporated with each other. But when special event happens, the bureaus can integrate or corporate with each other by the pressure of supervisor or the Assembly and by the budget. In the long term, the bureaucract will find out that the benefit of integration gradually decreasing. As this situation happens, the corporation between the bureaus will break down and even will make the bureau clash with each other.
Because of the inducement and the benefit will influence the action and decision of bureaucract, so the reform of water resource management should augment the inducement design and arrangement. The ways to solve the problem of burears integration are a) institution reform of natural resources management, and b) deregulation.
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