The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China
碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 96 === In this research, samples were taken from both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises that have recently gone IPO. The porpose of the research are to find out whethere state-owned enterprises are more likely to apply related party transactions to manage ea...
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ndltd-TW-096FJU003850232016-12-23T04:08:48Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24007625049152069772 The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China 關係人交易、盈餘管理與利益輸送之研究:以大陸IPO公司為例 Hsui-Ling Lin 林秀玲 碩士 輔仁大學 會計學系碩士班 96 In this research, samples were taken from both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises that have recently gone IPO. The porpose of the research are to find out whethere state-owned enterprises are more likely to apply related party transactions to manage earnings prior to going IPO than private enterprises are, wherether tunneling is present following IPO, and how investors respond to the information contents of related party transactions in post- IPO period. We also discuss whether good corporate governance can reduce the intensity of Tunneling. Our findings are summarized below: 1.When a company is going to IPO, state-owned enterprises are more likely to use related party transactions to manage earnings than r private enterprises are. 2.if earnings are manipulated through related party transactions before going to IPO, tunneling of state-owned enterprises is more serious than that of private enterprises. 3.If earnings are manipulated by related party transactions before IPO, the return on investment in state-owned enterprises is less than that in private enterprises. 4.Following IPO, the corporate governance can strengthen the supervisory system, but the phoniminon of tunneling is not mitigating. Chi-Yun Hua 華琪筠 2008 學位論文 ; thesis 68 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 96 === In this research, samples were taken from both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises that have recently gone IPO. The porpose of the research are to find out whethere state-owned enterprises are more likely to apply related party transactions to manage earnings prior to going IPO than private enterprises are, wherether tunneling is present following IPO, and how investors respond to the information contents of related party transactions in post- IPO period. We also discuss whether good corporate governance can reduce the intensity of Tunneling. Our findings are summarized below:
1.When a company is going to IPO, state-owned enterprises are more likely to use related party transactions to manage earnings than r private enterprises are.
2.if earnings are manipulated through related party transactions before going to IPO, tunneling of state-owned enterprises is more serious than that of private enterprises.
3.If earnings are manipulated by related party transactions before IPO, the return on investment in state-owned enterprises is less than that in private enterprises.
4.Following IPO, the corporate governance can strengthen the supervisory system, but the phoniminon of tunneling is not mitigating.
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author2 |
Chi-Yun Hua |
author_facet |
Chi-Yun Hua Hsui-Ling Lin 林秀玲 |
author |
Hsui-Ling Lin 林秀玲 |
spellingShingle |
Hsui-Ling Lin 林秀玲 The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China |
author_sort |
Hsui-Ling Lin |
title |
The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China |
title_short |
The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China |
title_full |
The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China |
title_fullStr |
The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Study of Related Party Transactions、Earnings Management and Tunneling:An Empirical Study of Publicly listed companies in China |
title_sort |
study of related party transactions、earnings management and tunneling:an empirical study of publicly listed companies in china |
publishDate |
2008 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24007625049152069772 |
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