The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms
碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 企業管理碩士學程 === 96 === Prior studies of the financing contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs most typically focus on analytical deduction. Specifically, they investigate agency settings with double moral hazard and/or adverse selection. In contrast, this study empiric...
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ndltd-TW-096NCTU51210162019-05-15T19:39:37Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/veuf4k The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms 實證探討美國創投與創業家間資訊不對稱與相對談判優劣勢,對其融資工具選擇之影響 Chien-Liang Liao 廖健良 碩士 國立交通大學 企業管理碩士學程 96 Prior studies of the financing contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs most typically focus on analytical deduction. Specifically, they investigate agency settings with double moral hazard and/or adverse selection. In contrast, this study empirically tests the effect of information asymmetry and bargaining power on the choice among financing securities including debt, convertible debt, convertible preferred stock, and convertible debt plus convertible preferred stock. The proxy variables for moral hazard and/or adverse selection are volatility of earnings, percentage of research and development expense, percentage of intangible assets, and type of industry. Consistent with the notion that new venture firms adopt financing contracts to alleviate earnings manipulation and/or moral hazard, the results show that the companies with volatile earnings, high intangible assets, and firms in the biotechnology industry tend to issue more debt or convertible debt. Hsiou-Wei W. Lin Tang, Y. Edwin 林修葳 唐瓔璋 2008 學位論文 ; thesis 32 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 企業管理碩士學程 === 96 === Prior studies of the financing contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs most typically focus on analytical deduction. Specifically, they investigate agency settings with double moral hazard and/or adverse selection. In contrast, this study empirically tests the effect of information asymmetry and bargaining power on the choice among financing securities including debt, convertible debt, convertible preferred stock, and convertible debt plus convertible preferred stock. The proxy variables for moral hazard and/or adverse selection are volatility of earnings, percentage of research and development expense, percentage of intangible assets, and type of industry. Consistent with the notion that new venture firms adopt financing contracts to alleviate earnings manipulation and/or moral hazard, the results show that the companies with volatile earnings, high intangible assets, and firms in the biotechnology industry tend to issue more debt or convertible debt.
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author2 |
Hsiou-Wei W. Lin |
author_facet |
Hsiou-Wei W. Lin Chien-Liang Liao 廖健良 |
author |
Chien-Liang Liao 廖健良 |
spellingShingle |
Chien-Liang Liao 廖健良 The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms |
author_sort |
Chien-Liang Liao |
title |
The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms |
title_short |
The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms |
title_full |
The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms |
title_fullStr |
The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Bargaining Power on the Choice among Financing Securities for US Venture Firms |
title_sort |
effect of information asymmetry and bargaining power on the choice among financing securities for us venture firms |
publishDate |
2008 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/veuf4k |
work_keys_str_mv |
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