The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 96 === In 2005, signatories negotiated post-Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHGs) abatement at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper discusses the process of each country deciding whether or not to become a member of...

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Main Authors: LIU, YING-CHI, 劉縈錡
Other Authors: LEE, TSUNG-CHEN
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2008
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66512313662049226722
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spelling ndltd-TW-096NTPU03890182015-10-13T13:47:38Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66512313662049226722 The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading 國際排放交易參與誘因及環境有效性之研究 LIU, YING-CHI 劉縈錡 碩士 國立臺北大學 經濟學系 96 In 2005, signatories negotiated post-Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHGs) abatement at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper discusses the process of each country deciding whether or not to become a member of International Emission Trading (IET), which is an abatement mechanism listed in the Kyoto Protocol. Besides, since there is no central authority with the power to determine the initial allocation of tradable allowances, each country will choose its initial allowance based on its self-interest. Whether the global GHGs emissions are rising or falling is ambiguous. Therefore, the environmental effectiveness of IET is still unknown. With the theoretical models and numerical simulations, we have several findings: (1) There are three conditions in the forming of IET group. The first condition is that countries which belong to the IET group won’t deviate from it. When the countries face the greenhouse effect, they could reduce their own emission, trade emission with other countries, or both, to solve the problem. The second condition is that countries which don’t belong to IET group won’t join it. The only way for them to solve the greenhouse effect is to reduce their own emission. The third condition is that each country thinks that the group type is best. (2) The environmental effectiveness of IET depends on the technology and the environmental damage of the IET membership. If the members with lower environmental damage have the higher technology and the members with higher environmental damage have the lower technology, IET is environmentally effective. (3) The numerical simulation shows that China and European Union will participate in IET, but the United States won’t. (4) The total GHGs of the situation in (3) will be lower than the situation where three countries all participate in IET or all not. LEE, TSUNG-CHEN 李叢禎 2008 學位論文 ; thesis 88 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 經濟學系 === 96 === In 2005, signatories negotiated post-Kyoto greenhouse gases (GHGs) abatement at the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This paper discusses the process of each country deciding whether or not to become a member of International Emission Trading (IET), which is an abatement mechanism listed in the Kyoto Protocol. Besides, since there is no central authority with the power to determine the initial allocation of tradable allowances, each country will choose its initial allowance based on its self-interest. Whether the global GHGs emissions are rising or falling is ambiguous. Therefore, the environmental effectiveness of IET is still unknown. With the theoretical models and numerical simulations, we have several findings: (1) There are three conditions in the forming of IET group. The first condition is that countries which belong to the IET group won’t deviate from it. When the countries face the greenhouse effect, they could reduce their own emission, trade emission with other countries, or both, to solve the problem. The second condition is that countries which don’t belong to IET group won’t join it. The only way for them to solve the greenhouse effect is to reduce their own emission. The third condition is that each country thinks that the group type is best. (2) The environmental effectiveness of IET depends on the technology and the environmental damage of the IET membership. If the members with lower environmental damage have the higher technology and the members with higher environmental damage have the lower technology, IET is environmentally effective. (3) The numerical simulation shows that China and European Union will participate in IET, but the United States won’t. (4) The total GHGs of the situation in (3) will be lower than the situation where three countries all participate in IET or all not.
author2 LEE, TSUNG-CHEN
author_facet LEE, TSUNG-CHEN
LIU, YING-CHI
劉縈錡
author LIU, YING-CHI
劉縈錡
spellingShingle LIU, YING-CHI
劉縈錡
The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading
author_sort LIU, YING-CHI
title The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading
title_short The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading
title_full The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading
title_fullStr The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading
title_full_unstemmed The participation Incentive and Environmental Effectiveness of International Emissions trading
title_sort participation incentive and environmental effectiveness of international emissions trading
publishDate 2008
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66512313662049226722
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