Analyzing the Ratio of Joint Burden in Urban Land Readjustment via Game Theory

• Main Authors: Yu-chieh Chen, 陳鈺傑
• Other Authors: Chi-jen Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50113043441006211080

碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 都市發展與建築研究所 === 96 === “Urban land readjustment” is an implement for urban land development. Under the principle of “beneficiary's paying,” local government can acquire public facility land via the calculation of the ratio of joint burden without paying. For landowner, the increase of land price after readjustment can be one of their benefits. For local government and landowner, there can be a win-win situation with the initiation of land readjustment. Although there is an upper bounded limit rule about the ratio of joint burden for landowners to guarantee their land rights, landowners will make a stand against the high ratio of joint burden. These kind of resistance could be procrastinate the construction projects. Take the 44th readjustment area in Kaohsiung for example, local government decided to increase the intensity of land use for that they could get higher ratio of joint burden in return. Nonetheless, the argument about the intensity of land use in planning phase took local government approximately 7 years, which caused the inefficiency of the readjustment. This study attempts to solve the controversy over the ratio of joint burden with the construction of game theory model. Based on the use of game theory model, local government can find out the best strategy in every readjustment case. On the other hand,it can avoid irrational resistance from landowners and let them understand their best “payoff” in this “ratio of joint burden game.”