A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry.
碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 96 === When the separation of managership and ownership exists, firm will try to issue CEO equity-linked compensation in order to solve the agency problem of equity and to enhance firm value. Whether this phenomenon exists in regulated banking industry is worthy to be add...
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ndltd-TW-096PU0053040102016-05-13T04:14:38Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01777110481650866114 A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. CEO誘因薪酬觀點探討美國銀行業權益代理問題 I-Chen Liu 劉怡君 碩士 靜宜大學 財務金融研究所 96 When the separation of managership and ownership exists, firm will try to issue CEO equity-linked compensation in order to solve the agency problem of equity and to enhance firm value. Whether this phenomenon exists in regulated banking industry is worthy to be addressed. By employing simultaneous equation, the sample of U.S. banking industry is used to explore the relationship between CEO incentive compensation and bank performance so as to examine existence of the agency problem of equity in banking industry. Besides, considering external monitoring mechanism in banking industry, whether the incentive compensation could substitute for the external monitoring is also examined. The empirical results find incentive compensation does exist in regulated banking industry, however, it becomes weak after controlling external monitoring mechanism. The results show that the performance of banking industry relies more on external monitoring mechanism than does on the CEO incentive compensation. Min-Lee Chan 陳明麗 2008/06/ 學位論文 ; thesis 53 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 靜宜大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 96 === When the separation of managership and ownership exists, firm will try to issue CEO equity-linked compensation in order to solve the agency problem of equity and to enhance firm value. Whether this phenomenon exists in regulated banking industry is worthy to be addressed. By employing simultaneous equation, the sample of U.S. banking industry is used to explore the relationship between CEO incentive compensation and bank performance so as to examine existence of the agency problem of equity in banking industry. Besides, considering external monitoring mechanism in banking industry, whether the incentive compensation could substitute for the external monitoring is also examined. The empirical results find incentive compensation does exist in regulated banking industry, however, it becomes weak after controlling external monitoring mechanism. The results show that the performance of banking industry relies more on external monitoring mechanism than does on the CEO incentive compensation.
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author2 |
Min-Lee Chan |
author_facet |
Min-Lee Chan I-Chen Liu 劉怡君 |
author |
I-Chen Liu 劉怡君 |
spellingShingle |
I-Chen Liu 劉怡君 A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. |
author_sort |
I-Chen Liu |
title |
A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. |
title_short |
A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. |
title_full |
A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. |
title_fullStr |
A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. |
title_full_unstemmed |
A perspective of CEO incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the U.S. banking industry. |
title_sort |
perspective of ceo incentive compensation in examining the agency problem of equity in the u.s. banking industry. |
publishDate |
2008 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01777110481650866114 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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