A Threshold Analysis of the Mutual Fund Performance and the Corporate Governance of its Invested Portfolios

• Main Authors: Chien-Yin Wu, 吳倩銀
• Other Authors: 趙莊敏
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2008
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/st4d4g

碩士 === 國立臺北科技大學 === 商業自動化與管理研究所 === 96 === Prior studies document that companies that offered higher disclosure quality, greater transparency, higher outside ownership, and more focused organization usually experienced better stock price performance. The data used in this study is the 126 open-end equity mutual funds in Taiwan observed from January, 2005 to December, 2007. Using Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression model, this study argues that the effect of better corporate governance cumulate number ratio on the mutual fund performance and risk is different in signs or statistical significance when the mutual fund data is grouped based on their better corporate governance holding ratio. We find that better corporate governance cumulate number ratio of mutual fund investment objective has negative effect on mutual fund risk. It means that if mutual fund holds better corporate governance objectives for a long time, its risk will be reduced obviously. In the other hand, better corporate governance cumulate number ratio of mutual fund investment objective has positive effect on mutual fund performance. It means that if mutual fund holds better corporate governance objectives for a long time, its performance will be improved obviously.