| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 96 === This paper investigates the relationship between governance attributes and credit ratings, firm systematic risk, firm-specific risk, and ROE risk. We find that firms with a greater proportion of their shares held by activist institutions and officers have lower risk of credit ratings, and lower firm systematic risk, firm-specific risk and ROE risk. And firms with a greater proportion of their shares held by blockholders have higher risk of credit ratings, lower firm systematic risk and higher firm-specific risk. Higher place of independent directors and inspectors result in lower risk of credit ratings and lower ROE risk, and greater proportion of their shares held by directors and inspectors have higher risk of credit ratings. We also find that firms reporting with higher quality have lower risk of credit ratings and lower firm systematic risk, firm-specific risk, and ROE risk, and firms reporting with higher timeliness have lower risk of credit ratings, lower firm-specific risk and ROE risk. Our results show that a firm with better governance could decrease the risk of bondholders, stockholders, enterprise and other stakeholders.
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