The Sensitivity of Executives’ Compensation to Accounting performance Measures versus Market Performance Measures.

• Main Authors: Chin-Hua Wang, 王金華
• Other Authors: Jia-Xun Jiang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97968314162270203530

碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 會計學系碩士班 === 97 === The thesis examines the sensitivity of executives’ compensation to accounting performance measures and market performance measures. The sample consists of observations selected from listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2007. The empirical results are summarized as follows. The association of executives’ compensation with market (accounting) performance measures was higher (lower) for firms with more profitable investment opportunities. Besides, as the noise of market measures relative to accounting measures increases, executives’ compensation will be more sensitive to accounting measures and less sensitive to market measures. I also find that larger managerial shareholdings and larger free cash flows will increase (decrease) the accounting of executives’ compensation with accounting (market) measures.