Public Preference, Inflation Targets and Inflation Contracts

• Main Author: 蕭宜廷
• Other Authors: 朱美麗
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2009
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72637994730810031716

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 經濟研究所 === 97 === The paper studies the central bank’s monetary policy under pure discretionary, noncontingent targeting and targeting with announcement. We construct models with different weight on inflation and output in the social welfare function. Furthermore, we introduce the central bank’s deviations from the preference of the medium voters into the models to show the effects on monetary policy. The inflation bias is larger when there is more weight on output in the social welfare function in the case of pure discretionary policy and noncontingent targeting. In the case of targeting with announcement, regardless of more weight on inflation or on output, the inflation bias is either larger or smaller under different conditions. Besides, a greater penalty on the central bank’s deviations from the inflation target may increase or decrease the effect of announcements on the public’s inflation expectations. With consideration of the central bank’s deviations from the preference of the medium voters, the inflation bias is still smaller when there’s more weight on inflation in the social welfare function in the case of pure discretionary policy and noncontingent targeting. In targeting with announcement, the inflation bias may still be larger or smaller. However, with the central bank’s deviations from the preference of the medium voters, the inflation bias can be reduced further under some conditions.