| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立屏東商業技術學院 === 經營管理研究所 === 97 === The purpose of this paper is to investigate two kinds of channel performance, including electronic markets and traditional markets, under consignment contract with revenue sharing. The manufacturer acting as a follower, chooses how many units of the product to produce and the retail price, and retains ownership of the goods. The retailer acting as a leader, offers the manufacturer a revenue sharing contract, which specifies the percentage allocation of sales revenue between herself and the manufacturer. For each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the manufacturer. This paper is coordinating the supply chain in buyer centric B2B electronic markets under consignment contract with revenue sharing. Because of the emergence of electronic markets, the retailer switches to electronic markets and stops buying goods from the manufacturer in traditional markets. After losing the retailer, the manufacturer has to decide to join electronic markets and to win the retailer’s order back. The retailer can pay the manufacturer a premium to induce manufacturer stay in the electronic markets. The numerical results show that the solution generated by the electronic markets outperforms that by the traditional markets in maximizing profits of channel, retailer and manufacturer.
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