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碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 97 === After the Enron Case, a lot of financial scandals reveal in succession in Taiwan. To avoid similar case occur in the future, the government promotes the reform of Corporate Governance actively. Independent directors must have professional qualification to enhance the...
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ndltd-TW-097SCU053850112015-10-13T15:43:07Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46504919550310740493 none 獨立董監具會計師事務所經歷與財報品質之研究 Yu-ling Tsai 蔡玉玲 碩士 東吳大學 會計學系 97 After the Enron Case, a lot of financial scandals reveal in succession in Taiwan. To avoid similar case occur in the future, the government promotes the reform of Corporate Governance actively. Independent directors must have professional qualification to enhance the supervision of financial statements. Previous research regarding independent directors and supervisors usually focus on the relationship between the independent directors and the operating performance or the relationship between the independent directors and earnings management. The background of the independent directors will affect the effect of supervision. This study examines whether the independent directors and supervisors of companies with working experience of CPA firms can restrain that the managers adopt aggressive accounting behavior for window dressing financial statements. Using the Kothari (2005) model to calculate abnormal accruals for listed companies in 2006 and 2007, we find that companies employing independent directors and supervisors with working experience of CPA firms reported lower abnormal accruals than other companies, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect abnormal accruals. In addition, this study also observes that companies employing independent directors and supervisors who previously was an auditor at the company’s current auditing firm report lower abnormal accruals than other firms. Yu-Hui Su 蘇裕惠 2009 學位論文 ; thesis 61 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 97 === After the Enron Case, a lot of financial scandals reveal in succession in Taiwan. To avoid similar case occur in the future, the government promotes the reform of Corporate Governance actively. Independent directors must have professional qualification to enhance the supervision of financial statements.
Previous research regarding independent directors and supervisors usually focus on the relationship between the independent directors and the operating performance or the relationship between the independent directors and earnings management. The background of the independent directors will affect the effect of supervision.
This study examines whether the independent directors and supervisors of companies with working experience of CPA firms can restrain that the managers adopt aggressive accounting behavior for window dressing financial statements. Using the Kothari (2005) model to calculate abnormal accruals for listed companies in 2006 and 2007, we find that companies employing independent directors and supervisors with working experience of CPA firms reported lower abnormal accruals than other companies, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect abnormal accruals. In addition, this study also observes that companies employing independent directors and supervisors who previously was an auditor at the company’s current auditing firm report lower abnormal accruals than other firms.
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Yu-Hui Su |
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Yu-Hui Su Yu-ling Tsai 蔡玉玲 |
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Yu-ling Tsai 蔡玉玲 |
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Yu-ling Tsai 蔡玉玲 none |
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Yu-ling Tsai |
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2009 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46504919550310740493 |
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AT yulingtsai none AT càiyùlíng none AT yulingtsai dúlìdǒngjiānjùhuìjìshīshìwùsuǒjīnglìyǔcáibàopǐnzhìzhīyánjiū AT càiyùlíng dúlìdǒngjiānjùhuìjìshīshìwùsuǒjīnglìyǔcáibàopǐnzhìzhīyánjiū |
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