| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 97 === Information asymmetry has been a popular phenomenon in the variety of agency structures, and it results in agency problems. To prevent the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard resulted from information asymmetry, the principal should formulate a set of useful audit policy. Traditionally, we assume that agents who face the uncertain situations will evaluate their personal gain or loss in a self-interested and rational way. Based on experience of life and experimental results, however, it can be found that people may adopt irrational decision-making behavior with some reasons. This study uses two-period game to discuss how to adjust audit probability to formulate optimal audit policy in order to maximize the principal’s profits under the assumptions that the agent facing uncertain risks can be either rational or irrational.
The results show that, in order to maximize the principal’s expected profits, the principal will consider different rational structures among agents. In addition, the optimal audit policy for the second period does not necessarily depend on the audit result in the first period. Therefore, memory mechanism does not work for conditional audit in two-period game.
|
|---|
