| Summary: | 碩士 === 東吳大學 === 會計學系 === 97 === Shareholder is the owner of the corporation, the purpose of operation of the corporation is to maximize the wealth of shareholder. Hence, the policy of corporate earnings distributed is deeply related to the rights and interests of shareholders. However, agency problem between controlling shareholders and other shareholders is quite usual in Taiwan corporations. Controlling shareholders often affect the corporation to pay higher bonus and board’s compensations for self-interest purpose, therefore it would undoubtedly affect shareholder’s rights and interests. Corporate Governance Mechanisms is to reduce agency cost and guarantee shareholder’s interest. Thus, the main purpose of this study is to examine the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and the decision of corporate earnings distributed, using data of companies listed in Taiwan Stock from 1999 to 2007. And the using independent variables are cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders, deviation rate between cash flow and voting rights, institutional ownership, duality of chairman of board of directors and CEO, Deviation Rate between cash flow and the board rights, and the index of Corporate Governance. The findings of this study are summarized as follows.
1.Companies with better governance structure tend to pay more dividends to shareholders, and pay less bonus and board’s compensations.
2.Companies with better governance structure tend to pay less stock bonus and more stock dividends to protect shareholder’s right and interest.
3.Companies with better governance structure tend to decrease resources of stock dividend from additional paid-in capital, and increase resources of stock dividend from retained earnings.
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