| Summary: | 碩士 === 樹德科技大學 === 金融與風險管理所 === 97 === According to Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for TSEC/GTSM Listed Companies released in October 2002, the primary objectives of corporate governance are to enhance information disclosure and improve information transparency. Among Three Pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (hereafter referred to Basel 2), officially implemented in 2006, Pillar 3 - Market discipline aims at providing public disclosure of information to enhance capital constraints and to promote the secure and stable functions of financial system. The ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) and overall risk are chosen as dependent variables to measure the influence of the ownership structure of bank and information disclosure on the bank risk-taking to explore the influence of information disclosure on the bank risk-taking due to the implementation of Basel 2.
The empirical results show that: before information disclosure of Basel 2, the degree of credit bank risk-taking is significantly higher when the share-holding percentage of large shareholders is higher; the degree of credit bank risk-taking is significantly lower when both the share-holding percentage of the foreign investors is higher and the franchise value for banks is higher. After information disclosure of Basel 2, the degree of credit bank risk-taking is significantly lower when the share-holding percentage of the management levels is higher, the scale of the board is larger, and the franchise value for banks is higher. Before information disclosure of Basel 2, the degree of credit bank risk-taking is significantly higher when the share-holding percentage of large shareholders is higher, the share-holding percentage of the management levels is higher, the share-holding percentage of the foreign investors is higher, and the franchise value for banks is higher. After information disclosure of Basel 2, the degree of credit bank risk-taking is significantly lower when the share-holding percentage of large shareholders is higher, the share-holding percentage of the management levels is higher, the share-holding percentage of the foreign investors is higher, the scale of the board is larger, and the franchise value for banks is higher.
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