| Summary: | 碩士 === 東海大學 === 會計學系 === 97 === The authority of enterprise and management separation could be the chief factors causing the problem of information asymmetry between managers and share holders. Part of researchers found that distributes shares to CEOs will assist in decreasing the information asymmetry ( ie. Berlie and Means 1932, Jensen and Mechling 1976), however such statement could not be proved in consistency by researchers. In one’s thesis will further investigate the relationship of CEO’s holdings and information asymmetry in the supply chain, in which the stock liquidity will be taken as a measure for information asymmetry (Mohd 2005, Liao 2009, Cheng 2004).
According to the results of the empirical, providing the bonus by distributing shares to CEO can reduce the impact of information asymmetry whilst also increase stock liquidity. The beginner relationship of enterprise in the supply chain, the supplier will tend to be beneficial to enterprise, therefore when a positive performance is achieved the problem of information asymmetry will be decreased relatively. In contrary, a negative performance will result delays to any relevant information, hence increasing the impact of information asymmetry. However, having both CEO holdings and a good interaction effect in supply chain relationship will increase the impact of information asymmetry as in comparing to the result of a negative supply chain relationship.
When come to the conclusion of my thesis suggests, as in terms of considering the quality of internal control system, the relationship of all parties in supply chain is acting a more determining role, which shall also be taken into account by governors and investors in evaluating an enterprise. When the performance of the enterprise does not meet the expectation, delaying of information by any parties in the supply chain shall be considered as a factor.
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