China''s Strategy of “Containing Taipei Through Washington”(1995.6∼2008.3)-An Analysis based on Beaufre''s “Indirect Strategy”Theory.

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班 === 97 === The Chinese Communist Party has always insisted on holding main contradictory when engaging in political struggle. Since secession and anti-secession were China’s major contradictories in dealing with Taiwan issue, China believes that it could seize the co...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Shu-Hui Chang, 張淑慧
Other Authors: Cheng-Chuan Shih
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2009
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06805224602710776595
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Summary:碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所碩士在職專班 === 97 === The Chinese Communist Party has always insisted on holding main contradictory when engaging in political struggle. Since secession and anti-secession were China’s major contradictories in dealing with Taiwan issue, China believes that it could seize the core of the issue by resolving Taiwan-independence concern. In this resolving process, US-Taiwan relations is the key. Seeing America’s determination and strength in tackling Taiwan problems, especially from the lessons of Taiwan Strait crises, China knew its limitations of balancing against the U.S. Meanwhile, China comprehended that stable domestic and foreign environments contribute to its modernization. It accordingly developed a “Containing Taipei through Washington” strategy. The strategy aimed at restraining Taiwan through enhancing US-China relations, and this approach parallels André Beaufre’s “indirect strategy,” which emphasized that victory should be won by paralyzing the adversary through non-military action. Thus, the author tries to adopt Beaufre’s theoretical basis to verify China’s strategy. This thesis has five chapters. Chapter one explains western strategist’s understanding of strategy, including the traditional definition and Beaufre’s theory that strategy is a method of thought. Further, the author elaborates relations between “total strategy” and “indirect strategy” in Beaufre’s studies, clears up differences between Beaufre’s “indirect strategy” and B.H. Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach,” and researches into the connotation of “indirect strategy.” In chapter two, the author introduces historical background of China’s “Containing Taipei through Washington” strategy and studies how the strategy was formed. Later in chapter three, significant elements in Beaufre’s theory, such as “indirect pressure,” “spiritual strength,” and “exterior maneuver,” would be introduced. Chinese leaders’ cognition of the strategy is also discussed. Fourthly, the author attempts to analyze China’s substantial approaches (e.g. political, economic, psychological and military) in materializing the strategy with Beaufre’s “exterior maneuver,” which serves as the central thought of his “indirect strategy” theory. Finally, with regard to China’s strategic actions to carry out “Containing Taipei through Washington” strategy, the author would make an effort to evaluate consequence, both in positive and negative facets.