| Summary: | 碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 98 === Neither investors nor competent authorities expect any insider trading occurred in capital market; they even manage to set up mechanisms against it. However, insider trading mainly exists in the environment of information asymmetry, which is impossible to eliminate completely. Serious information asymmetry encourages insider trading, impacts transaction fairness, and further reduces market liquidity. Regulatory authorities therefore adopt law to require companies to reveal more information. In Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Institute （SFI） establishes the Information Transparency and Disclosure Ranking System （ITDRS） in 2003 and produces evaluation reports for every following year, mainly to urge companies to disclose information more openly, reduce the problem of information asymmetry, and strengthen the development of securities markets.
However, disclosure mechanisms seem not work in companies with serious agency problems. This is mainly because agency problems are part of the reason that leads to the environment of information asymmetry. This study uses Taiwan Listed and OTC companies from 2000 to 2008 as samples to investigate the relationship between agency problems and information asymmetry. The empirical results show that when companies face single agency problem, the information asymmetry is certainly very serious. And when companies simultaneously face two types of agency problems, it also causes double influence on information asymmetry.
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