Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 財政研究所 === 98 === Since the prevalence and availability of digital technologies, the cost of piracy becomes lower and lower. The society is full of counterfeiter and counterfeit, hence it is very important to protect the intellectual property. This paper assumes that the domestic company obtains the intellectual property. We try to discuss how the domestic government determines the optimal enforcement rate and to what extent is the domestic company willing to pay for political contributions if the domestic company is the only one lobbyist. Furthermore, considering the cost of crackdown on imitations, we find that the government decides the optimal enforcement rate according to the size of the market, and the domestic company has the desire to engage in lobbying only when the market is in the middle size. If there is some cost of squashing pirates, that optimal enforcement rate is more likely to be zero.
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