Audit Fee Disclosure, Corporate Governance, and Market Reactions.

• Main Authors: Kuo,Ching Yun, 郭青雲
• Other Authors: Chou,Ling tai Lynette
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57851275754696185262

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計研究所 === 98 === This study attempts to examine audit fee disclosure and market reactions. We use Cumulative Abnormal Returns to measure market reactions. First, we analyze whether audit fee disclosure has any market reactions at all. Second, we divide the samples into voluntary disclosure and forced disclosure groups. Third, we make further segmentation from the forced disclosure group according to their disclosure reasons, and specially focus on the disclosure reason of high non-audit fees. We find that market reactions are significantly more positive for firms with audit fee disclosures than for firms without fee disclosure. Market reactions are also significantly better for firms with voluntary disclosure than the forced disclosure group. In contrast, market reactions are significantly lower for firms which disclose audit fees due to high levels of non-audit fees. Our evidence supports that audit fee is a piece of useful and important information to investors. Additionally, we include corporate governance variables in the analysis. We find that when firms’ corporate governance is not good, if they choose to disclose audit fee voluntarily, the market responds with positive reactions. In contrast, if a firm’s corporate governance is quite good but discloses audit fees due to high levels of non-audit fee, the market then reacts with negative returns.