The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents
碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) === 98 === Cross-selling seems to be a popular business model for most financial institutions. Various M&A are employed by financial institutions for the purpose of resources integration and business growth across different sectors. The establishment of financial...
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ndltd-TW-098NCCU53880982015-10-13T18:44:53Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86829232900165853238 The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents 人壽保險業務員通路於金控子公司共同行銷之風險管理 高穎祥 碩士 國立政治大學 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) 98 Cross-selling seems to be a popular business model for most financial institutions. Various M&A are employed by financial institutions for the purpose of resources integration and business growth across different sectors. The establishment of financial holding companies has further accelerated the scope of business. It is very critical to leverage the advantage of strong channels to enhance synergy via cross-selling. Life insurance agents position themselves importantly for the performance of the holding company groups as they provide one-stop service, face to face interact, and satisfy the demand with their customers by leveraging the customer relationship. But the high customer complaint rations arose the concern with the appropriateness of cross-selling of the agents and the legacy risk, and encourage us to identify the related risk and figure out possible solutions. This research tries to simulate the genres of complaints and the patens of cross-selling of the agents for the purpose of identifying sources of risk. It is concluded that the agents should be well monitored and restrained because of their trade-off mind-sets and value. If not, mis-behaviors can happen along with the growth of business. In response to the related risk, this research based on operation experience leads to several suggestions according to the genres of mis-behaviors to the related entities. First, the life insurance companies should play attention to the enforcement of cross-selling skills and education of regulation of the agents, the punishment of mis-behaviors, and insurance mechanism to diversify related risks. Secondly, the holding companies should build the mechanism of identifying, measuring, and preventing the related risks, manage the risk by using group resources, and replicate the experience and know-how among the subsidiaries. Finally, the supervisory authority should consider the adjustment of performance measurement of the P&C insurance sector, try to guide the sector by change of rules, and try to set up the complaint process from the level of the holding companies and the business associations sequentially, first and then transfer these accumulated experiences and rules to the institution handling arguments about cross-selling after its official establishment in the future. Then the consumers can be well protected without any gap. It is expected that the cross-selling model can be run much better to enhance the operation efficiency of holding company groups and protection of consumers due to the cooperation of related entities. 張士傑 學位論文 ; thesis 82 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) === 98 === Cross-selling seems to be a popular business model for most financial institutions. Various M&A are employed by financial institutions for the purpose of resources integration and business growth across different sectors. The establishment of financial holding companies has further accelerated the scope of business. It is very critical to leverage the advantage of strong channels to enhance synergy via cross-selling. Life insurance agents position themselves importantly for the performance of the holding company groups as they provide one-stop service, face to face interact, and satisfy the demand with their customers by leveraging the customer relationship. But the high customer complaint rations arose the concern with the appropriateness of cross-selling of the agents and the legacy risk, and encourage us to identify the related risk and figure out possible solutions.
This research tries to simulate the genres of complaints and the patens of cross-selling of the agents for the purpose of identifying sources of risk. It is concluded that the agents should be well monitored and restrained because of their trade-off mind-sets and value. If not, mis-behaviors can happen along with the growth of business. In response to the related risk, this research based on operation experience leads to several suggestions according to the genres of mis-behaviors to the related entities. First, the life insurance companies should play attention to the enforcement of cross-selling skills and education of regulation of the agents, the punishment of mis-behaviors, and insurance mechanism to diversify related risks. Secondly, the holding companies should build the mechanism of identifying, measuring, and preventing the related risks, manage the risk by using group resources, and replicate the experience and know-how among the subsidiaries. Finally, the supervisory authority should consider the adjustment of performance measurement of the P&C insurance sector, try to guide the sector by change of rules, and try to set up the complaint process from the level of the holding companies and the business associations sequentially, first and then transfer these accumulated experiences and rules to the institution handling arguments about cross-selling after its official establishment in the future. Then the consumers can be well protected without any gap. It is expected that the cross-selling model can be run much better to enhance the operation efficiency of holding company groups and protection of consumers due to the cooperation of related entities.
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張士傑 |
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張士傑 高穎祥 |
author |
高穎祥 |
spellingShingle |
高穎祥 The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
author_sort |
高穎祥 |
title |
The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
title_short |
The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
title_full |
The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
title_fullStr |
The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
title_full_unstemmed |
The risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
title_sort |
risk management of the cross-selling among the financial holding company’s subsidiaries by the channel of life insurance agents |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86829232900165853238 |
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