A Study of the Impact of Intangibles, Information Disclosure Rank and Ownership Structure on the Characteristic of Analysts' Forecasts

• Main Authors: Shih-TingLai, 賴詩婷
• Other Authors: Ling-Fen Lin 林玲芬
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87159121551073272721

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 會計學系碩博士班 === 98 === This research examines the impact of firms’ intangibles, information disclosure rank and ownership structure on the characteristic of analysts’ forecasts. Owing to the future uncertainty economic benefit of intangibles, the uncertainty makes investor to need more the information of analysts’ forecasts, and increases the usefulness of analysts’ forecasts. Furthermore, there is an influence on individual analyst uses the extent of their common information and their own idiosyncratic knowledge and skill, because of asymmetric information. Also, the holding rate of the internal party and foreign investments will impact on the disclosure quality of financial statement and there is a considerable discrepancy on individual analysts’ forecasts. So we use Barron, Byard, Kile, Riedl and Demers (2002)model to measure the the uncertainty, consensus and aggregating benefit of the information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts, separately using Tobin’s Q as the proxy of firms’ intangibles, regard the information disclosure rank releasing by securities and futures institute as information transparency, and the holding rate of internal party, defined as manager, board,and primary shareholder, and foreign investments to examine the influences on the characteristic of analysts’ forecasts. The empirical results are as follow：(1)The higher degree of uncertainty exists among analysts forecasting earnings for high-intangible firms than low-intangible firms. And the aggregating benefit of analysts’ forecast is greater for high-intangible firm than for low-intangible firm. (2)The higher information-disclosure-rank firms have higher consensuses, lower uncertainty and smaller aggregating benefit of analysts’ forecast than lower information-disclosure-rank firms. (3)The holding rate of manager, board, and primary shareholder has a remarkable positive correlation with the uncertainty and the aggregating benefit of analysts’ forecast. And the holding rate of manager and primary shareholder has a remarkable positive correlation with consensuses. Then, the higher of the foreign investments, there will be the lower uncertainty but higher consensuses.