An Analysis of Top Executive Compensation, Earnings Management, and Profitability

• Main Authors: Hung, Tang-Cheng, 洪堂城
• Other Authors: Hung, Pi-Hsia
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30445562744578733881

碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 財務金融學系 === 99 === The main purpose is to investigate the relationships among top executive compensation, earnings management, and profitability. We adopted Taiwan Listed companies to be our samples during the period from January 1997 through December 2009. The empirical results show that, the higher top executive compensation of wage, there is a lower degree for the top executive to earnings management in the t-1 term; the greater earnings management, there is a lower degree of top executive wage in the t+1 term, indicating that there is a negative correlation in before or after the occurrence period between top executive wage and earnings management. Top executive compensation has extremely close and inseparable relations with profitability, the higher top executive compensation, the higher profitability is. The manager can only manipulate controllable profitability, without altering accounting performance that is uncontrollable. The number of board and the board duality dummy can increase the function of supervision externally.