| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 98 === The study’s first part extends Antras et al.(2008) to explore how the host country’s enforcement of intellectual property right affects multinational firm activity, foreign direct investment, and external investors’ funding. Our model predicts that the multinational firm’s expenditure in monitoring managerial misbehavior will be increasing in the en-forcement level of IPR; it is not like what the effect of investor protection will have. Also, the higher the rent of technology expropriation, the less the amount of FDI is.
In the second part, we adapt the framework of Marin and Schnitzer (2006) to analyze how the strength of property right affects multinational firms’ choice of financing FDI and hence shapes their allocation of controlling right. The stronger the multinational firms’ property right over their FDI, the more effective they make its controlling right, and the lower effort the manager choose. The more loosely multinational firms hold the property right of FDI, the smaller manager’s effort effect, the larger his repayment effect, and the more costly the capital. In this case, multinational firms choose large credit; otherwise, small credit is firms’ choice.
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