| Summary: | 博士 === 國立臺灣師範大學 === 政治學研究所 === 98 === This dissertation attempts to analyze Ronald Dworkin’s democratic thought of law and political philosophy. Instead of the majoritarian democracy, Dworkin claims that a genuine democracy means not only majority rule but also the people govern themselves each as a full partner in a collective political enterprise. I will argue and elucidate that “partnership democracy” comes from many ideas of Dworkin’s political and legal theory such as human dignity, ethical individualism, egalitarian liberalism, political community, rights, principle, law as integrity, moral reading of the constitution and so on. For Dworkin, partnership democracy has expanded the meanings of democracy. In search of “what is democracy?”, the thesis constructed Dworkin’s main conceptions of moral, political, and law, discussed the philosophical controversy, and critically reflected his theory to answer the jurisprudence questions: “what is law?”.
There are three parts included in my arguments. First, in the constructive interpretation for democracy, I investigate Dworkin’s ethics of human dignity, political philosophy of equality, and law as integrity. They manifest the theoretical grounds, political background and conceptual relations of partnership democracy. By debating on “constitutional democracy” and “partnership democracy”, the thesis justified Dworkinian theory of partnership democracy. Secondly, the thesis defends philosophical controversy below: (1) Is human dignity objectivie and universal? (2) Do liberty and equality conflict? (3) How is liberal community possible? (4) For the
good life, is it still neutrality of state? (5) What is the relation between law and moral? (6) Is a judicial review undemocratic? (7) Is there any conflict between constitutionalism and democracy? From holism, Dworkin’s coherence arguments deals with the conflict of these values. Finally, based on Jürgen Habermas’ deliberative democracy that criticizes and challenges partnership democracy, I think that Dworkinian “hedgehog” democracy aimed at integrating all values into a whole of ethic framework is noble and ideal, but democracy practice requires more than this. In other words, I argue that if there are public sphere, civil society, discourse or communicative action in partnership democracy, Dworkin’s thought is much more convincible and attractive.
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