The Association between Corporate Governance and Firm Value of GTSM-TWSE Transfer Companies

• Main Authors: SIE, MIN-TING, 謝旻廷
• Other Authors: HUANG, CHUNG-HUEY
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97760738828447123585

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 98 === This study examines the GTSM-TWSE transfer companies applied with simplified batch review as a shortcut to switch listing, for the reason that the OTC listed companies in Taiwan want to switch to listing,and there is a motivation in insiders to maximize their wealth.However,with the diverge between voting right and cash flow right ,there exists the agency problem from the conflict of interest between the management and the external investors.As a result,how the corporate governance of exchange listings influence the corporate value has been the motivation of this study. The objectives of this research are as follows: 1) the association between shareholdings of insiders and nature of board of directors and the decision making of transfer listing firms. 2) the influence of shareholdings of insiders and nature of board of directors on the corporate value of transfer listing firms. This model is applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market (TSE and OTC market)from 1990 to 2004. We will use linear regression model to analysis insider ownership,nature of board of directors and Corporate Governance.The sample population are 151 companies. Model one is paired-samples of the on-cabinet companies according to industry, size and on-cabinet years.Our observations are 302 . The empirical findings of this research are as follows : (1) The correlation between the shareholdings of major shareholder and decision making.of transfer listing is positive,and the correlation between the size of the board of directors and the decision making of transferring into TWSE is negative. (2) In contrast with companies before transferred, the level of negative correlation between shareholding of major shareholders and the value of corporation is higher at the initial stage of transferred. The correlation between shareholding of managers and the value of corporation is significant negative during the first three year of transferred ; there is no significant result between shareholdings of directors and the company efficiency after exchange listing. Both pledged shares of directors and size of board of directors have negative correlation with the value of corporation, and the significance level become higher as time after exchange listing. The correlation between CEO duality and Tobin’s Q after exchange listing is positive, and the level of significance is high. (3) In our sample, companies which has lower shareholding of managers, smaller size of board of directors, and CEO duality, the degree of change of Tobin’s Q are higher. Our research shows that shareholding of insiders and the nature of the board of directors have different degree of influence on its decision for exchange listing. After the firms exchange listing, the shareholding of shareholders, shareholdings of managers, pledge shares of directors and size of the board of directors have negative relationship with the values of firms. Thus, the results concurred with the hypothesis of plundering benefits and tallies with our prediction.