Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 98 === In this study, I would like to examine how investment layers relate to firm-level capital investment efficiency. I first argue that investment layers will reduce investment efficiency because the complex process of transferring information from the lowest-tier f...

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Main Authors: Su-Jung Huang, 黃姝榕
Other Authors: Wen-Hsin Hsu
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2010
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19958410836813715984
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spelling ndltd-TW-098NTU053850432015-11-02T04:04:04Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19958410836813715984 Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency 金字塔投資架構與投資效率 Su-Jung Huang 黃姝榕 碩士 國立臺灣大學 會計學研究所 98 In this study, I would like to examine how investment layers relate to firm-level capital investment efficiency. I first argue that investment layers will reduce investment efficiency because the complex process of transferring information from the lowest-tier firms to the parent company on the apex of investment structure can increase information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders. Besides, as controlling shareholders usually expropriate resources through the pyramid investment structure, I argue that the agency problems between management and outside capital providers can increase as the number of layers increases. Using the negative sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a proxy for investment efficiency, I find that the number of investment layers in firms’ investment structure is negatively related to investment efficiency. Wen-Hsin Hsu 許文馨 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 60 en_US
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description 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 98 === In this study, I would like to examine how investment layers relate to firm-level capital investment efficiency. I first argue that investment layers will reduce investment efficiency because the complex process of transferring information from the lowest-tier firms to the parent company on the apex of investment structure can increase information asymmetry between the firm and outsiders. Besides, as controlling shareholders usually expropriate resources through the pyramid investment structure, I argue that the agency problems between management and outside capital providers can increase as the number of layers increases. Using the negative sensitivity of investment to cash flow as a proxy for investment efficiency, I find that the number of investment layers in firms’ investment structure is negatively related to investment efficiency.
author2 Wen-Hsin Hsu
author_facet Wen-Hsin Hsu
Su-Jung Huang
黃姝榕
author Su-Jung Huang
黃姝榕
spellingShingle Su-Jung Huang
黃姝榕
Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency
author_sort Su-Jung Huang
title Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency
title_short Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency
title_full Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency
title_fullStr Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency
title_full_unstemmed Investment Pyramid Layers and Investment Efficiency
title_sort investment pyramid layers and investment efficiency
publishDate 2010
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19958410836813715984
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