none

• Main Authors: Hung-han Lin, 林泓翰
• Other Authors: Chinn-ping Fan
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69566999012943909876

碩士 === 東吳大學 === 經濟學系 === 98 === When there are existences of complementary effects among goods, package auctions can be employed to reduce the risks that are produced by the fact that bidders only win partial goods and do not have other relevant goods to cooperate. This paper attempts to analyze two auction mechanisms (namely VCG mechanism and the first-price package auction) by experiment, as well as discuss the similarities and differences of these two auction mechanisms under different firms’ structure and different relations among goods. In efficiency, there is no significant distinction between VCG mechanism and the first-price package auction under those conditions mentioned above. Moving onto the revenue, the auctioneers under VCG mechanism will gain lower revenues than those of first-price package auction. That is, under some auction situation, there is a significant difference between these two approaches. In addition, if the opportunity costs of goods are lower, the revenue of VCG mechanism will be lower than that of first-price package auction. When discussing the payoff, there is a significant difference between these two methods. The payoff of VCG mechanism’s bidders will be higher, compared with that of first-price package auction’s bidders. In VCG mechanism, the major bidders’ behaviors are bidding by the truthful valuations or over the valuations. Compared with the behaviors of these two types of auctions, it can generally be acknowledged that the amounts of bids of first-price package auction are lower than those of VCG mechanism. In average, the goods which are not bidden are in the vicinity of 6.25 %. After excluding these behaviors, the result of regression supports VCG mechanism – bidder will bid by the truthful valuations.