The Study on Derivatives Trading and Director Structure for Taiwanese Listed Companies

• Main Authors: Kuo-Pao Hung, 洪國寶
• Other Authors: Po-Kai Huang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/56177324380100254986

碩士 === 世新大學 === 財務金融學研究所(含碩專班) === 98 === This research aims at examining the correlation between derivatives financial products and the board of directors of the listed companies in Taiwan. Firstly, Logit regression model was used to analyze whether the designated companies execute derivatives transactions or not. Secondly, OLS regression model was applied to assess the degree of influence of board structure when companies operated the derivatives. Samples of analysis are distinct from three dimensions: all samples, foreign shareholding ratio to be greater / smaller than average. The results from the first method with all samples show a significant positive correlation among the size of board of directors, the share ratio of supervisors and relational parties, and the ratio of foreign shareholders, nevertheless, there is a significant negative correlation with ratio of independent director seats. Under the circumstances foreign shareholding ratio to be greater than average, there is a significant positive correlation between the percentage of foreign shareholding and the size of board of directors whereas the ratio of independent director seats shows a significant negative correlation. However, when the foreign shareholding ratio is smaller than average, only the foreign shareholding reveals a significant negative correlation. In terms of the degrees of manipulation with derivatives, the size of board of directors and the foreign shareholding ratio indicate an obvious positive correlation under the circumstance of all samples being analyzed, in which only the ratio of stock mortgage from the director and supervisors indicates a significant negative correlation. When the foreign shareholding ratio was greater than average, a significant positive correlation found on the size of board of directors and the ratio of foreign shareholding, whereas the ratio of stock mortgage from the director and supervisors display a significant negative correlation. Lastly, when the percentage of foreign shareholding is smaller than average, it shows a significant significant positive correlation between the degree of share rights centralization and the stock percentage of supervisors and relational parties.