The Impact of Independent Director and Supervisor on the Risk Taking and Performance: Evidence from the Taiwan banking Industry

碩士 === 南台科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 98 === This paper mainly discuss the reasons why banks set up the independent directors and also wonder what the impacts that the independent directors make about taking risk and performance of banks. There are 31 banks in Taiwan from 1997 to 2009 in this paper that resea...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yi-Ting Lin, 林儀婷
Other Authors: Hsiao-Jung Chen
Language:zh-TW
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73592497570966666890
Description
Summary:碩士 === 南台科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 98 === This paper mainly discuss the reasons why banks set up the independent directors and also wonder what the impacts that the independent directors make about taking risk and performance of banks. There are 31 banks in Taiwan from 1997 to 2009 in this paper that researches by Ordinary Lease Squares Method (OLS). The Empirical results point out that banks are willing to set up the Independent directors when the institutional investors’ percentage of holders increase and the banks’ profitability decrease. In other words, the higher percentage of inside holders is, the lower demand of setting up the Independent directors is. Moreover, this paper also shows that it doesn’t improve the banks’ performance even increases the risks after setting up the Independent directors. Besides, the paper also detects that the effective method to reduce risks and improve performance of banks is related to the percentage of inside holders and institutional investors.