The U.S. Government Decision-Making Process of 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

• Main Authors: Shao-Cheng Sun, 孫紹正
• Other Authors: 陳一新
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2010
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04172561312600693571

博士 === 淡江大學 === 美洲研究所博士班 === 98 === Although there is a large number of publications of 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, only very few theoretical studies adopted theory-confirming case studies in order to verify hypotheses about official declassified archives. This dissertation attempts to do so. Taking into consideration that the US security commitments to Taiwan played a crucial role in the survival of Taiwan, the aim of this study is to explore President Eisenhower’s interests and the organizational stances of his administration, as well as the participants’ competition regarding the decision-making processes during the aforementioned crisis, being the main objective the finding of the patterns and essence of the actual concerns of US leaders in such processes. This dissertation attempts to verify three main hypotheses derived from decision-making theory, and focuses on the decision-making process of the Eisenhower administration. In order to do so, this study tries to answer the following questions: (1) what were the objectives, alternatives, and choices that Eisenhower –in his leading role as US head of state– had during the crisis? (2) what were the stances and debates between the US State Department and the Department of Defense in dealing with the crisis? (3) How did participants of the action channels utilize their bargaining skills and interacted with Eisenhower to compete their proposals? First, adopting the point of view of the Rational Actor Model, this study tried to demonstrate that Eisenhower –based on the US national interests– chose those proposals that, made by the leading bureaucrats of his administration, represented with higher interests and lower costs. In the beginning, Eisenhower considered that publicly stating the US intention of defending Quemoy was too costly and was, therefore, unwilling to make the Newport Statement. But the US military intervention was to eventually be decided by President Eisenhower alone, which he finally agreed to do. It shows that Eisenhower’s evaluation of proposals was flexible and influenced by both the domestic and international environment. Second, from the Organizational Behavior Model, Eisenhower apparently preferred the State Department’s proposals. Thus, the Department of Defense started to adjust its previously strong-arm methods. For instance, the Department of Defense proposed “close-in escort for Taiwan’s vessels” and “the use of nuclear weapons” proposals, which were both rejected by Eisenhower. He assessed that these proposals were too risky and costly. Soon after that, the Department of Defense altered its plans to meet Eisenhower’s expectations. It indicates that an organization may alter its proposals based on the President’s acceptance in order to meet his mindset. Third, from the Government Politics Model, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was master-minded in nurturing relations with the President. He also narrowed the number of participants involved in the decision-making processes. Thus, others were unable to affect the outcome. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray were newly appointed. It was difficult for them to offer creative and feasible suggestions. The Central Intelligence Agency Director Allen Dulles emphasized that his organization could only provide intelligence, but not get involved in policy making. Consequently, his influence in the action channel was limited. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Nathan F. Twining’s attitude toward the crisis was tough in the beginning. After Twining learned that Eisenhower had determined to use the least cost in maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, his attitude started to lean toward the President’s side. It showed that John Dulles was good at highlighting his importance within the action channel. He then gained an upper hand in the decision-making process. In comparing with other participants, some of them were not familiar with the cross-strait issues and still others’ opinions diverged from the President’s stance. Therefore, their role in the decision-making process became less effective. Finally, the findings of the research are as follows: (1) Eisenhower preferred low-cost proposals; (2) If the crisis fell into the responsibility of a particular organization, proposals from this organization would be more favourably considered by the President; (3) If participants’ proposals wanted to be accepted, they needed to include the President’s ideas; (4) The decision of defending the offshore islands would be made by the President; (5) Eisenhower was not going to use nuclear weapons to defend Quemoy;(6) Eisenhower achieved his objectives through the leading bureaucrats; and (7) US/China/Taiwan were seeking their national interests in dealing with the offshore islands crisis. To conclude, this study proves that the Eisenhower administration handled the crisis mainly through its assessment of the cost of proposals, the capability of organizations, and competitions among participants. Despite most scholars believe that Eisenhower had willingly made efforts to defend Quemoy, this study has found that, actually, it was just the opposite case. In fact, Eisenhower had no desire to defend Quemoy. When the Department of Defense suggested military counter-measures in the defense of offshore islands, such measures were turned down by Eisenhower. He also assigned his leading bureaucrats to diminish the crisis at the US expense, but Eisenhower remained the key person behind the scene. Thus, the main theme of this dissertation is that as Eisenhower used his influence on agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Defense on the one hand and the Secretary of State Dulles on the other to maximize the national interests of the United States, he successfully prevented further escalation of the Quemoy crisis.