The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融學系 === 98 === This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that l...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2010
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35381744399832785512 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融學系 === 98 === This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that low value fund’s ratio of board independence helps monitor the cross fund subsidization conducted by fund family relative to funds in different families. The result of board concentration on low value fund implies that independent directors sitting on many funds tend to become rubber stamps, failing to exercise fiduciary duties. But the result of an independent chairman dummy is inconsistent with my hypothesis.
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