The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融學系 === 98 === This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that l...
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ndltd-TW-098YZU053040232015-10-13T18:20:57Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35381744399832785512 The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families 美國基金市場的獨立董事與利益衝突 Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸 碩士 元智大學 財務金融學系 98 This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that low value fund’s ratio of board independence helps monitor the cross fund subsidization conducted by fund family relative to funds in different families. The result of board concentration on low value fund implies that independent directors sitting on many funds tend to become rubber stamps, failing to exercise fiduciary duties. But the result of an independent chairman dummy is inconsistent with my hypothesis. Christine W. Lai 賴慧文 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 31 en_US |
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碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融學系 === 98 === This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that low value fund’s ratio of board independence helps monitor the cross fund subsidization conducted by fund family relative to funds in different families. The result of board concentration on low value fund implies that independent directors sitting on many funds tend to become rubber stamps, failing to exercise fiduciary duties. But the result of an independent chairman dummy is inconsistent with my hypothesis.
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author2 |
Christine W. Lai |
author_facet |
Christine W. Lai Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸 |
author |
Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸 |
spellingShingle |
Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸 The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families |
author_sort |
Lu-Yi Chiou |
title |
The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families |
title_short |
The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families |
title_full |
The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families |
title_fullStr |
The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families |
title_sort |
board independence and conflicts of interests in the u.s. mutual fund families |
publishDate |
2010 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35381744399832785512 |
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