The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families

碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融學系 === 98 === This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that l...

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Main Authors:	Lu-Yi Chiou, 邱露逸
Other Authors:	Christine W. Lai
Format:	Others
Language:	en_US
Published:	2010
Online Access:	http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35381744399832785512

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spelling	ndltd-TW-098YZU053040232015-10-13T18:20:57Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35381744399832785512 The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families 美國基金市場的獨立董事與利益衝突 Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸碩士元智大學財務金融學系 98 This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that low value fund’s ratio of board independence helps monitor the cross fund subsidization conducted by fund family relative to funds in different families. The result of board concentration on low value fund implies that independent directors sitting on many funds tend to become rubber stamps, failing to exercise fiduciary duties. But the result of an independent chairman dummy is inconsistent with my hypothesis. Christine W. Lai 賴慧文 2010 學位論文 ; thesis 31 en_US
collection	NDLTD
language	en_US
format	Others
sources	NDLTD
description	碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融學系 === 98 === This study extends Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2006) by considering corporate governance of low family value funds ranked by their net style returns. By analyzing the sample combined with EDGAR and CRSP Mutual Fund Database from 2002 to 2008, the result suggests that low value fund’s ratio of board independence helps monitor the cross fund subsidization conducted by fund family relative to funds in different families. The result of board concentration on low value fund implies that independent directors sitting on many funds tend to become rubber stamps, failing to exercise fiduciary duties. But the result of an independent chairman dummy is inconsistent with my hypothesis.
author2	Christine W. Lai
author_facet	Christine W. Lai Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸
author	Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸
spellingShingle	Lu-Yi Chiou 邱露逸 The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
author_sort	Lu-Yi Chiou
title	The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
title_short	The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
title_full	The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
title_fullStr	The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
title_full_unstemmed	The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families
title_sort	board independence and conflicts of interests in the u.s. mutual fund families
publishDate	2010
url	http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/35381744399832785512
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The Board Independence and Conflicts of Interests in the U.S. Mutual Fund Families

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