The Moderating Effect of Family Firms on the Relationship between CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking
碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計與資訊科技研究所 === 99 === To solve the agency problem, previous research studied how to align the interests of shareholders and CEOs, and found that firms can reduce agency costs through compensation design. The incentive factors in compensation will encourage CEOs to engage in risky i...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2011
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/68419329130441740604 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計與資訊科技研究所 === 99 === To solve the agency problem, previous research studied how to align the interests of shareholders and CEOs, and found that firms can reduce agency costs through compensation design. The incentive factors in compensation will encourage CEOs to engage in risky investment, and then enhance the level of risk-taking. Literature also found that the effects of incentive factors are different. The agency cost is less in family firms than non-family firms. This study will examine the effect of family firms on the relationship between CEO compensation and risk-taking.
The empirical results indicate that the incentive effect of stock dividends and cash compensation will be weakened and the incentive effect of options will be enhanced in family firms. The effect of family firms on the relationship between stock price volatility and risk-taking is not significant. In addition, this study also finds that the relationship between CEO compensation and risk-taking is stronger in electronics industry.
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