An Empirical Study of Equity Turnover, Agency Problems and Corporate Value

• Main Authors: Yu-Ching Lee, 李育青
• Other Authors: Hui-Fun Yu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52886145856341944535

碩士 === 清雲科技大學 === 國際企業管理研究所 === 99 === Scientific statistic methods were employed, and not only the variable of financial ratios but also the variable of corporate governance were included to establish an effective financial alert model and further ensure the rights and interests of creditors and shareholders. In terms of empirical analysis, the logit regression model was employed to select significant variables influencing corporate performance for the corporate financial alarm. The findings are as follows. Financial and non-financial variables influenced corporate performance mainly in terms of debt-paying ability, management capability, profitability, and corporate governance. The higher the interest protection multiples were, the stronger the corporate debt-paying ability would be, and the more protection the creditors would have. When a president did not concurrently serve as a general manager, the shareholders’ equity turnover ratio and the retention ratio should be moderately reduced, which could strengthen the corporate governance and increase the corporate performance. When the right of management was separate from ownership, capability would advance corporate governance, enhance inside and outside supervision, decrease agency problems, and further increase corporate value. Consequently, the empirical value and management implication lay in capability, agency problems, corporate governance, and corporate performance.