Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group
碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) === 99 === This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characterist...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02015343082723287001 |
id |
ndltd-TW-099NCCU5388161 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-099NCCU53881612016-07-02T04:19:58Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02015343082723287001 Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group 大同集團企業股權結構與控股型態之探討 王盈琇 碩士 國立政治大學 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) 99 This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characteristics of different boards of directors and corporate ownership structure of the Tatung business group. Corporate governance related issues are then identified, followed by discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies. The analysis indicates that cross-holdings, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are approaches applied by the Lin Family to actively control the Tatung business group. An analysis on the measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights and cash flow rights are on average 1.17%, 21.83% and 1.07%, respectively, while the board seat-control ratio is 61.85%. The average deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 20.76% (60.79%). The number of board seats controlled by the owner is 178.01 times greater than cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owner gets approximately 178 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, in this study of the Tatung business group, we examine the emptied assets case, significant capital reduction, and the transparency of financial information of investment in Nature Worldwide Technology Corporation. For the corporate ownership structure and the characteristics of different boards of directors of the Tatung business group, we identify the critical issues regarding corporate governance. Finally, discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies are provided. Keywords: Business group; Corporate ownership structure; Corporate governance; Board seat-control. 林宛瑩 學位論文 ; thesis 74 zh-TW |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
zh-TW |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) === 99 === This study employs the Tatung business group as our sample and defines the ultimate owner as the entity with ultimate influence over major decisions regarding the operation, management, and allocation of company resources. We first analyze the characteristics of different boards of directors and corporate ownership structure of the Tatung business group. Corporate governance related issues are then identified, followed by discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies.
The analysis indicates that cross-holdings, pyramid structure and seat control over the board members are approaches applied by the Lin Family to actively control the Tatung business group. An analysis on the measurement of voting rights, cash flow rights and board seat-control shows that direct shareholding, voting rights and cash flow rights are on average 1.17%, 21.83% and 1.07%, respectively, while the board seat-control ratio is 61.85%. The average deviation between voting right (board seat-control) and cash flow rights is 20.76% (60.79%). The number of board seats controlled by the owner is 178.01 times greater than cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate owner gets approximately 178 units of controlling power through one unit of capital input. To the extent that ownership and control is highly deviated, a weaker disciplinary effect and a stronger entrenchment effect can be expected. In addition, in this study of the Tatung business group, we examine the emptied assets case, significant capital reduction, and the transparency of financial information of investment in Nature Worldwide Technology Corporation. For the corporate ownership structure and the characteristics of different boards of directors of the Tatung business group, we identify the critical issues regarding corporate governance. Finally, discussions on the deficiencies of relevant regulations and suggestions for improvements on government policies are provided.
Keywords: Business group; Corporate ownership structure; Corporate governance; Board seat-control.
|
author2 |
林宛瑩 |
author_facet |
林宛瑩 王盈琇 |
author |
王盈琇 |
spellingShingle |
王盈琇 Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group |
author_sort |
王盈琇 |
title |
Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group |
title_short |
Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group |
title_full |
Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group |
title_fullStr |
Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group |
title_full_unstemmed |
Study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of Tatung business group |
title_sort |
study of corporate ownership structure and board seat-control of tatung business group |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02015343082723287001 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT wángyíngxiù studyofcorporateownershipstructureandboardseatcontroloftatungbusinessgroup AT wángyíngxiù dàtóngjítuánqǐyègǔquánjiégòuyǔkònggǔxíngtàizhītàntǎo |
_version_ |
1718330948608589824 |