| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 國家政策與公共事務研究所 === 99 === After the Chinese Communist party founded the People''s Republic of China in Mainland, and the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan. Since then there have been two independent political powers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The relationship between the cross-Strait has been staying at the same stage of war. Meanwhile, whether Taiwan will declare independence or not become the only factor that could pull the trigger and Beijing will decide how far they are willing to go if there is a war, and U.S will be the game changer if they decide to interfere in order to protect their benefits in the Asia-Pacific region; As the cross-Strait are more willing to open up multiple conversations with each other, they came up with the idea of confidence-building measures (CBMs). At this moment, Taiwanese government’s reaction will decide whether the confidence-building measure will be happening or not, PRC will set the rules, and obviously U.S will be extremely concerned about their benefits in the Asia-Pacific region. Whether there will be a war or not, they are all connected to the strategic triangle relations between U.S, Taiwan and China; the change of situations from wartime to easement, and re-open for conversation, these changes explain that the cross-Strait relation shift as time goes by. The main focus of the paper is to discuss the possibility to use confidence-building index as a measuring tool to over view the changes of the cross-Strait relation from different perspectives.
The changing of the relationship between the cross-Strait is not only the matters between the Nationalists and Communists. U.S.A.─A third-party has also been deeply involved and had great influences to both sides. Lowell Dittmer’s Strategic Triangle theory – interactions between a trio-relation that have strong influence on the balance between two powers under the game theory, and it differentiate the shifting of situation between these three parties into four types, which are menage a trios, romantic, marriage, and unit-veto, and use each one of them as an independent variable to explain the change of cross-Strait relation. Base on the interactions between the cross-Strait from different periods of time, and the analysis on the differences of the CBMs index from each period, we can contrast them and explain our result. Base on the analysis, we can come up with a further assumption on the opportunities, challenges, and executions brought by the trust-building measures between the cross-Strait. Non-official contact is not the only way to open up the conversation between the cross-Straits, but also through economical and cultural channels, and include comprehensive and insensitive topics in the discussion. Besides that fact that they are part of the CBMs, most importantly, it will help the cross-Strait develop Military-trusting agreement, and peace treaties. These important contents can be use to define the Strategic-Traingle relation from different periods of the cross-Strait relation completely.
By studying the result, and return to the Strategic-Triangle relation between the U.S, China, and Taiwan; whether they will be a trust-building measure between cross-Strait or not depends on Taiwan, as China will take the lead, and the duration will depends on how deep U.S is willing to be involved in. Within the changing of all these different variables under the Strategic-Triangle relation, Taiwan can manage to find a way to be involved in setting the guidelines, and more overly, to organize it.
Through our research, we are expecting to find the answer for these three questions: 1) The Confidence-building measures and its influence to the cross-Strait. 2) The effectiveness and applicable area of the Strategic Triangle theory, and see if the size of the nation will become a factor on the effectiveness of the theory. 3) Are cross-Strait’s different perspectives on CBMs bringing any influences to the explanatory of the Strategic Triangle theory? In other words, through a provable topic, which are the differences on CBMs for both sides, are being used to examine the persuasiveness of this contest from a gaming-interactive-rational choice framework.
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