Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 99 === The research considers a duopoly market where airlines enter sequentially. The leader enjoys the benefit from being the first operator in the market and minimizes its operation cost, while the follower will consider the leader''s decision to...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2011
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70234600726423524356 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 99 === The research considers a duopoly market where airlines enter sequentially. The leader enjoys the benefit from being the first operator in the market and minimizes its operation cost, while the follower will consider the leader''s decision to make the optimum strategies to maximize its profit. The mathematical programming models are applied to formulate both the leader''s model and the follower''s model. A small example and a real network were used to test the proposed models under different scenarios. The results indicate that the airlines can earn the benefit by entering the market first while the follower can still compete with the leader by adjusting its airfare.
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