Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition

碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 99 === The research considers a duopoly market where airlines enter sequentially. The leader enjoys the benefit from being the first operator in the market and minimizes its operation cost, while the follower will consider the leader''s decision to...

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Main Authors: Chun-Hsien Wu, 吳俊賢
Other Authors: Ta-Hui Yang
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70234600726423524356
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spelling ndltd-TW-099NKIT56820552016-04-11T04:22:10Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70234600726423524356 Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition Stackelberg競爭模式下之航空網路設計 Chun-Hsien Wu 吳俊賢 碩士 國立高雄第一科技大學 運籌管理研究所 99 The research considers a duopoly market where airlines enter sequentially. The leader enjoys the benefit from being the first operator in the market and minimizes its operation cost, while the follower will consider the leader''s decision to make the optimum strategies to maximize its profit. The mathematical programming models are applied to formulate both the leader''s model and the follower''s model. A small example and a real network were used to test the proposed models under different scenarios. The results indicate that the airlines can earn the benefit by entering the market first while the follower can still compete with the leader by adjusting its airfare. Ta-Hui Yang 楊大輝 2011 學位論文 ; thesis 74 en_US
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description 碩士 === 國立高雄第一科技大學 === 運籌管理研究所 === 99 === The research considers a duopoly market where airlines enter sequentially. The leader enjoys the benefit from being the first operator in the market and minimizes its operation cost, while the follower will consider the leader''s decision to make the optimum strategies to maximize its profit. The mathematical programming models are applied to formulate both the leader''s model and the follower''s model. A small example and a real network were used to test the proposed models under different scenarios. The results indicate that the airlines can earn the benefit by entering the market first while the follower can still compete with the leader by adjusting its airfare.
author2 Ta-Hui Yang
author_facet Ta-Hui Yang
Chun-Hsien Wu
吳俊賢
author Chun-Hsien Wu
吳俊賢
spellingShingle Chun-Hsien Wu
吳俊賢
Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
author_sort Chun-Hsien Wu
title Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
title_short Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
title_full Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
title_fullStr Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
title_full_unstemmed Airline Network Design under Stackelberg Competition
title_sort airline network design under stackelberg competition
publishDate 2011
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70234600726423524356
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AT wújùnxián stackelbergjìngzhēngmóshìxiàzhīhángkōngwǎnglùshèjì
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