The Impact of the Legislative Electoral System Change on Grant Distribution in Taiwan

• Main Authors: Ying-Chieh Lai, 賴映潔
• Other Authors: Hong-Wung Wang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/48736546007028830976

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 99 === 　　In 2005, Taiwan Legislative Electoral System, SNTV, was replaced by single-district, two vote system. Based on distributive policy theory, this paper aims to explore how 6th legislators reacted and changed their pork barrel behaviors in order to maximize the probabilities to be reelected when facing the coming electoral rule. 　　By comparing 5th and 6th Legislators’ pork barrel behaviors, using “Creating Townscape Model Plan” as data, this paper has two findings. First, the analysis shows that the more the political power in an electoral district concentrates the more grants it gets. The reasonable explanation might be that when the political power in an electoral district is oligopolistic or even monopolistic, there exist a dominant representative, who has to take on more anticipation and accountability from the electorate than other electoral district, where political power are less concentrative,and thus the representatives in the higher concentrative electoral district has stronger motives to bring the pork home. 　　Also, this paper finds that the higher concentrative electoral districts receive more grants in the term of 6th legislators than in 5th; especially the party political power in an electoral district has more influence on grant distribution in 6th than in 5th. The reasonable explanation might be that the political behaviors had anticipated that party competition would be the core divergence in the following electoral campaign, and thus grants were distributed based on part domain so as to consolidate their own electoral bases.