Compensation Consultants and the CEO Pay Quality

• Main Authors: Yi-Ru Shyu, 徐懿儒
• Other Authors: 許文馨
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93609423335179401219

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 99 === This study is aimed at examining whether compensation consultants can help companies design a more effective payroll system for executives, or whether they have a reinforcing effect on the level of CEO compensation. The findings suggest that the CEO’s bonus, equity and total compensation are larger in firms that use compensation consultants and CEO’s salary proves to be positively correlated with his/her performance. In addition, I have examined whether compensation consultants will possibly lead to a higher CEO pay when the consultants are involved in a potential conflict of interests. I have also found that CEO pay is higher in companies where the consultants are engaged to provide other services, and that the CEO pay goes even higher in firms where more fees paid to consultants for other services than for executive compensation consulting services. Finally, I have observed that CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity decreases when the consultants who have a conflict of interests are engaged.