| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 應用經濟學系碩士班 === 99 === The objective of this paper is to discuss the factors in election that influence vote buying and their welfare implications.We investigate factors that cause vote buying to occur,and how these factors affect vote buying behaviors?In related literature the role played by vote-buying broker has not been formulated in any model.Therefore in this paper the objective of the broker is modeled and she/he has the (Stackelberg) first mover advantage in requesting commission,then in second stage,the candidate decides how to allocate its campaign money to maximize winning probability.
In this paper a one-shot game is modeled to analyze vote buying,when the candidate could advertize as well as buy votes,we found that when candidate's campaign fund is larger,the total expense needed to buy all voters is smaller,the advertisement is more efficient,and the broker's cost is lower,then the vote buying is more serious.However,by assuming that more than half of voters are located to the right and that they are perfectly reciprocal,the policy preferences of voters do not influence vote buying behavior.
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