| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 99 === When the two firms emit pollutants simultaneously and the government levies environmental tax on the polluting firms. This article constructs a three-stage game model to investigate firms’ pollution abatement policies and the social welfare effects under the cases of non-cooperation and cooperation respectively.
Main findings of this article are as follows: (1) Whether the firms are pollution abatement facilities cooperatively or not, the change of firm’s investment in pollution abatement facilities has an inverse relation with the change of the profits of the firms and pollution abatement ratios; The change of environmental tax has an inverse relationship with the change of profit and a positive relationship with pollution abatement ratio. (2) Regardless of whether firms use pollution abatement facilities cooperatively or not, the change of pollution abatement investment has positive relationship with the change of social welfare; The change of degree of environmental damage has inverse relationship with the change of social welfare. (3) Cooperative use of pollution abatement facilities by firms lead to higher level of pollution abatement ratio and more profit than those in non-cooperative case; Higher degree of pollution abatement facilities usage by firms, leading to increase in the difference between profits and pollution abatement ratios under cooperative use of pollution abatement facilities and non-cooperation; Higher the investment in pollution abatement facilities, then the difference between profits and pollution abatement ratios under cooperation and non-cooperation decreases.
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