The George W.Bush's Counter Terrorism in Afghanistan: The perspective strategy

• Main Authors: Wen,Yang Kuang, 溫洋廣
• Other Authors: Ma,Cheng Kun
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2011
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/04182482655879373579

碩士 === 國防大學政治作戰學院 === 政治研究所 === 99 === In 2001, Al Qaeda initiated the 9-11 terrorist attack on the United States, which shocked the globe, and changed President Bush’s strategy for the outside world, elevating anti-terrorism to the level of national security strategy. It emphasizes unilateral and preemptive strikes, without being restrained by international systems. According to the Beaufre’s total strategy, “strategy” is lifted from the military framework, and it is no longer restricted to using war to achieve objectives, but rather lists the military, politics, diplomacy, and economics as strategic tools at the same level, which interact in operation to achieve the objective of total strategy. The fight against terrorism is long-term resistance. In terms of Beaufre’s strategic thought, indirect strategy is very important in this context. However, Bush thought that the American military power was sufficient to achieve psychological effects for terrorism, so the total strategy was focused on the military, while the strategies in other categories accommodated military strategy. The military operation in Afghanistan quickly resulted in success, but in the stage of national reconstruction, strategies in economy, diplomacy, and politics should become the main focus. However, then the United States attacked Iraq, which asserted Bush’s use of military strategy as the core of total strategy. This has resulted in a split in the domestic camp that supported anti-terrorism, and there were waves of anti-American voices. Many countries began doubting American behavior on the international stage, and politically and diplomatically there were problems against the United States. The attack on Iraq affected anti-terrorism activities of the United States in Afghanistan, which have resulted in great limitations on the freedom of activity by the United States. With “external actions” being limited, and “internal actions” of material forces being worn away by the Taliban, it is fated to be mired in a Vietnam War-like obstacle. When Afghanistan was attacked, the three indicators of objective, military power, and freedom of movement all would have allowed the United States to execute the Clausewitz strategic form, and the American total strategy still could have supported its policy goals. However, there was too much optimism on military force and too much belief on the psychological effect on the enemy through material forces, so the Iraq War continued. This broadened the objects for the United States onAfghanistan and the anti-terrorism issue, but its military power was unable to find peace in both locations at the same time, and has been weakened by local rebel forces; this has caused the United States to be in a quagmire.