Mandatory Set-up of Independent Directors and Stock Returns: Evidence from Listed Financial Firms in Taiwan

碩士 === 東海大學 === 財務金融學系 === 99 === On February 22th and 25th 2002, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) modified The Rules of Governing Review Securities. The rule is that the new listed firms are requested to have independent directors and Supervisors. After t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Yi-Jyun Chen, 陳怡君
Other Authors: Chia-Wei Chen
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/67796855773778373497
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Summary:碩士 === 東海大學 === 財務金融學系 === 99 === On February 22th and 25th 2002, Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE) and GreTai Securities Market (GTSM) modified The Rules of Governing Review Securities. The rule is that the new listed firms are requested to have independent directors and Supervisors. After that the article 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act not only maintains the regulation of the numbers of independent directors, which is no less than two directors and one-fifth of the total number of directors, but also establish another rule for public financial industries or listed firms’ capitalization more than 500 billion, they are the main objects to having independent directors. In this paper, we collect annual data of financial firms listed in TWSE and GTSM for empirical analysis in 2005. Two important results are detected: (1) after the announcements about new independent director laws, there are significant positive cumulative average abnormal returns to financial firms. (2) The cumulative average abnormal returns of firms with more information disclosure are significantly higher than that of firms with less information disclosure. Therefore, this paper shows that it’s worthy to set the position of independent directors, and also proves that it’s efficient to the policy of mandatory set-up of independent directors.