Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan
碩士 === 雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系碩士班 === 99 === This paper examines the impact of founding family firms on the actual buyback activities of share repurchase program. Using a sample of public listing firms in Taiwan from 2000 to 2009, I find no difference between the completion ratios of founding family firms...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2011
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32879110775755649530 |
id |
ndltd-TW-099YUNT5304018 |
---|---|
record_format |
oai_dc |
spelling |
ndltd-TW-099YUNT53040182015-10-13T20:27:51Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32879110775755649530 Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan 台灣創辦家族企業庫藏股執行率之探討 Chia-Chi Yang 楊佳錡 碩士 雲林科技大學 財務金融系碩士班 99 This paper examines the impact of founding family firms on the actual buyback activities of share repurchase program. Using a sample of public listing firms in Taiwan from 2000 to 2009, I find no difference between the completion ratios of founding family firms and non-family firms. However, family firms tend to buyback shares at lower prices and are associated with lower credibility index, indicating that family firms repurchase shares to maintain stock price rather than to reduce free cash flow. Next, I find that firms with outside directors are associated with lower completion ratios and the credibility index. In addition, family firms with greater deviation of voting rights and cash flow rights are associated with lower completion ratios and credibility index. Finally, family CEOs have no significant effect on the actual buyback activities compared with hired CEOs. none 陳彥行 2011 學位論文 ; thesis 57 zh-TW |
collection |
NDLTD |
language |
zh-TW |
format |
Others
|
sources |
NDLTD |
description |
碩士 === 雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系碩士班 === 99 === This paper examines the impact of founding family firms on the actual buyback activities of share repurchase program. Using a sample of public listing firms in Taiwan from 2000 to 2009, I find no difference between the completion ratios of founding family firms and non-family firms. However, family firms tend to buyback shares at lower prices and are associated with lower credibility index, indicating that family firms repurchase shares to maintain stock price rather than to reduce free cash flow. Next, I find that firms with outside directors are associated with lower completion ratios and the credibility index. In addition, family firms with greater deviation of voting rights and cash flow rights are associated with lower completion ratios and credibility index. Finally, family CEOs have no significant effect on the actual buyback activities compared with hired CEOs.
|
author2 |
none |
author_facet |
none Chia-Chi Yang 楊佳錡 |
author |
Chia-Chi Yang 楊佳錡 |
spellingShingle |
Chia-Chi Yang 楊佳錡 Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan |
author_sort |
Chia-Chi Yang |
title |
Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan |
title_short |
Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan |
title_full |
Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan |
title_fullStr |
Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan |
title_full_unstemmed |
Founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in Taiwan |
title_sort |
founding family firms and the completion ratio of share repurchase program in taiwan |
publishDate |
2011 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32879110775755649530 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT chiachiyang foundingfamilyfirmsandthecompletionratioofsharerepurchaseprogramintaiwan AT yángjiāqí foundingfamilyfirmsandthecompletionratioofsharerepurchaseprogramintaiwan AT chiachiyang táiwānchuàngbànjiāzúqǐyèkùcánggǔzhíxínglǜzhītàntǎo AT yángjiāqí táiwānchuàngbànjiāzúqǐyèkùcánggǔzhíxínglǜzhītàntǎo |
_version_ |
1718048541462495232 |