Durable Goods Monopoly with Capacity Constraint and Individual Demand Uncertainty
碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 國際經營與貿易研究所 === 100 === This paper will investigate the best pricing strategy for durable goods monopolist with capacity constraint and individual demand uncertainty. We also introduce the concept of “per-period usage price” and illustrate the difference between traditional Coasia...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
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2011
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16979200862258027616 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 國際經營與貿易研究所 === 100 === This paper will investigate the best pricing strategy for durable goods monopolist with capacity constraint and individual demand uncertainty. We also introduce the concept of “per-period usage price” and illustrate the difference between traditional Coasian durable goods pricing strategy and ours. When the product utility turns out to be a bad outcome and its value is lower than the certain standard, first period’s per-period usage price will decrease while second period’s per-period usage price will increase simultaneously. This consequence is totally different from Coasian durable goods model.
When monopolist use non-commitment pricing strategy and face capacity constraint, monopolist will set the price for exerting the risk of rationing to consumers which will help monopolist gain higher profit than Coasian durable goods model. This shows that capacity constraint will help monopolist keep monopoly power and gain higher profit.
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